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THE RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL IN BENEFIT 
RECOVERY ACTIONS BROUGHT UNDER ERISA 
SECTION 502(a)(l)(B) 
I. - INTRODUCTION 
Much litigation has ensued over whether a party is entitled to a 
jury trial in a civil suit brought in federal court pursuant to § 502 
(a)(1)(B) ("§ 502") of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
of 1974 ("ERISA").I ERISA establishes a comprehensive scheme of 
federal laws governing pension plans, private welfare plans, benefit 
claims, and fiduciary responsibility. Enforcement under ERISA may 
arise when employees seek to recover earned pension benefits. 
Various federal courts, including some district courts within the 
same circuit, have considered the right to a jury trial in actions 
brought under ERISA and have reached conflicting decisions. 2 The 
importance of a jury trial to the plaintiff becomes obvious if one 
believes that the jury may be swayed by the relative financial resources 
of the opposing parties.3 
This Comment begins with an overview of standards employed 
by federal courts4 in determining whether a party is entitled to a jury 
trial generally. Next, the comment discusses how courts have applied 
these standards to jury trial requests in claims brought pursuant to 
§ 502. This second tier of analysis specifically focuses on: 1) cases 
decided prior to 1989; 2) Supreme Court decisions in Firestone Tire 
and Rubber Co. v Bruch,s Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg,6 and 
1. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(l)(B) (1988 & Supp. I 1989) [hereinafter § 502]. 
2. The United States Supreme Court has never directly addressed this issue. 
3. Note, The Right to Jury Trial in Enforcement Actions Under Section 502(0)(1)(8) 
of ERISA, 96 HARV. L. REv. 737 n.7 (1983). 
4. Although state courts have concurrent jurisdiction to hear claims brought under 
ERISA, the scope of this comment is limited to the federal law. Federal courts 
continue to interpret ERISA as broadly preemptive of state law claims relating 
to employee benefit plans in. the area of employee benefits, which narrows the 
extent to which these courts will hear pendent claims grounded in state law. 
29 U.S.C. § 1144 (1988 & Supp. I 1989) (stating that the provisions of ERISA 
supersede "any and all State laws" insofar as they relate to any employee 
benefit plan as described in the coverage of ERISA). See generally Pilot Life 
Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1989) (ERISA preempts state common law 
tort and contract claims alleging improper processing of an insured's claim for 
health benefits). 
5. 489 U.S. 101 (1989). 
6. 492 U.S. 33 (1989). 
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the 1990 decision of Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers, Local 391 
v. Terry;7 and 3) the impact of the Firestone, Granfinanciera and 
Terry decisions on federal courts deciding the § 502 litigant's right 
to a jury trial. The, Comment concludes that if the present Supreme 
Court were to decide the § 502 jury trial issue, it would most likely 
decide that a constitutional right to a jury trial does exist in certain 
circumstances. 
II. SECTION 502 AND THE RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL 
ERISA provides a "panoply of remedial devices" for both 
participants and beneficiaries of employee benefit plans.s These rem-
edies are specifically provided in § 502. Although this section defines 
six separate civil enforcement provisions granting participants, ben-
eficiaries, fiduciaries, and/or benefit plan administrators the right to 
bring suit if specified rights have been violated,9 the most frequently 
litigated provision - § 502 (a)(1)(B) - provides: 
[a] civil action may be brought by a partiCipant or benefi-
ciary . . . to recover benefits due him under the terms of 
his plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, 
or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of 
the plan .... 10 
An issue frequently raised in the context of § 502 litigation is 
whether the participant or beneficiary is entitled to demand a jury 
trial. While the standards are well settled for determining whether a 
litigant in a federal civil action is entitled to a jury trial, II application 
of these principles to a § 502 action has proved troublesome. 
The analysis of a federal civil litigant's right to a jury trial has 
two steps. First, the court will attempt to ascertain from the statute 
at issue whether Congress, either expresslyl2 or implicitly, 13 intended 
7. 494 U.S. 558 (1990). 
8. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 146 (1985). 
9. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (1988 & Supp. I 1989). 
10. [d. at § 1132(a)(1)(B). 
11. See, e.g., Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 192 (1974) (seventh amendment 
preserves the right to a jury in suit for damages brought pursuant to Title 
VIII); Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 533-34 (1970) ("corporation's suit to 
enforce a legal right was an action at common law carrying the right to a jury 
trial at the time the Seventh Amendment was adopted"); Dairy Queen, Inc. v. 
Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 476 (1962) (claim for breach of a licensing agreement 
seeking monetary damages is "unquestionably legal"; hence, seventh amend-
ment preserved the right to a jury). 
12. See, e.g., Allen v. United Mine Workers, 319 F.2d 594 (6th Cir. 1963) (An 
employee who sues pursuant to the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 
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to grant the right to a jury trial. If the court finds that Congress 
neither provided for nor intended to grant the right to a jury trial, 
then the court must determine if a litigant has a jury trial right 
pursuant to the seventh amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion,14 The seventh amendment provides that, "[i]n suits at common 
law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the 
right of trial by jury shall be preserved .... " IS 
III. THE LAW PRIOR TO 1989 
A. Jury Trials Under ERISA 
ERISA does not expressly grant a litigant the right to a jury 
trial. 16 Thus, a party seeking a jury trial in an ERISA action must 
attempt to establish that ERISA implies such a right, by proving 
that the statutory scheme and legislative history support such con-
gressional intent. As the case law demonstrates, the jury trial deter-
mination has proved to be a strained exercise in legislative intent 
analysis that has divided the federal courtS. 17 Moreover, the differ-
ences in the rationales argued by each side on the issue are not easily 
reconciled. 
1. Section 502 Claims - An Action at Law or Equity? 
In determining whether Congress intended to provide a jury trial 
right in ERISA, it is important to recognize i~itially that laws enacted 
by Congress are presumed to be constitutional. IS Furthermore, when 
Congress enacts a law or permits a remedy, it is presumed to know 
for monetary damages caused by the breach of a collective bargaining agreement 
is expressly entitled to a jury trial on request.). 
13. See, e.g .• Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 504 (1959) (Congress 
intended to provide a litigant with a jury trial in cases brought under federal 
antitrust laws); Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R.R. Co., 342 U.S. 359 
(1952) (implied right to a jury trial in cases brought under the Federal 
Employers' Liability Act). 
14. A cardinal rule which is followed by federal courts addressing the issue of 
whether a litigant has a right to a jury trial in an action brought under a 
federal statute is to "first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is 
fairly possible by which the [constitutional] question may be avoided." Curtis 
v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 192 n.6 (1974) (quoting United States v. Thirty-
Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 369 (1971». 
15. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
16. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (1988 & Supp. I 1989). See Turner v. CF & I Steel Corp., 
770 F.2d 43, 46 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1058 (1986). 
17. United States v. Thompson, 452 F.2d 1333 (D.C. Cir. 1971). See also infra 
notes 25-34 and accompanying text. 
18. Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957 (1982). 
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the judicial gloss previously given to the statutory language of that 
law or remedy, 19 and it adopts the existing interpretation of the 
language unless it expressly acts to change the meaning.20 
The Supreme Court has previously held that the right to a jury 
trial depends on whether the action is analogous to a "suit at common 
law;" that is, a suit appropriately brought in the English law courts 
prior to the adoption of the seventh amendment in 1791.21 If an 
action is analogous to a suit at common law, the plaintiff may 
demand that it be tried before a jury.22 Conversely, if an action is 
analogous to those historically tried in the courts of equity or 
admiralty in 18th century England, no jury trial is permitted.23 The 
modern Supreme Court approach in determining whether an action 
should be tried as one "at law" or "in equity" is to examine both 
the nature of the action and the remedy sought. 24 
To determine whether Congress intended to convey a right to a 
jury trial under a federal statute, courts examine Congressional 
language to see if the conferred remedies are "legal" in nature. If 
the language or remedies Congress has provided are "legal" in nature, 
courts are apt to find an implied right to a jury trial. 2S On the other 
hand, if courts find that Congress has used language or conferred 
remedies that are "equitable" in nature, courts are apt to find no 
such intent, and no right to a trial by jury. 26 
The courts, however, are divided over whether § 502 grants legal 
or equitable rights. A minority have read § 502 to confer a right "at 
law." The minority adopts the reasoning first set forth in Stamps v. 
Michigan Teamsters Joint Council 43. 27 
In Stamps, plaintiff brought suit to recover employee and union 
retirement benefits.28 The district court, noting jurisdiction under 
19. Blitz v. Donovan, 740 F.2d 1241, 1245 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
20. [d. 
21. Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 417 (1987). 
22. [d. 
23. [d. 
24. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 193 (1974); Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 
538 n.1O (1970); Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 477 (1962). 
25. Tull, 481 U.S. at 417-18. 
26. [d. The Supreme Court also noted that it "considered the practical limitations 
of a jury trial and its functional compatibility with proceedings outside of 
traditional courts of law in holding that the seventh amendment is not applicable 
to administrative proceedings." [d. at 418 n.4. However, in light of Granfi-
nanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33 (1989), discussed infra at notes 109-
24 and accompanying text, consideration of the jury's "functional compatibil-
ity" with non-Article III forums no longer appears to be relevant for purposes 
of the seventh amendment analysis. 
27. 431 F. Supp. 745 (E.D. Mich. 1977). 
28. [d. at 746. Initially an action for breach contract in state court, defendants 
removed the case to federal court. 
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both § 502 as well as the Labor-Management Relations Act (the 
"LMRA"), found that § 502 was silent as to whether Congress had 
created a legal or equitable claim.29 The federal court, however, 
denied the defendant's motion to strike plaintiff's request for a jury 
trial, reasoning that, because a companion provision - § 502(a)(3) 
- expressly provided for equitable relief,30 the absence of such a 
provision in § 502(a)(1)(B) should be construed as creating a legal 
claim entitling the plaintiff to a jury trial.31 
The Stamps court found support for its interpretation of ERISA 
in the legislative history. The court alluded to the Joint Explanatory 
Statement of the Committee of Conference, which provides: 
All such [§ 502] actions in Federal or State courts are to be 
regarded as arising under the laws of the United States in 
similar fashion to those brought under section 301 of the 
Labor Management Relations Act of 1947.32 
Relying upon this statement in the legislative history, the Stamps 
court reasoned that, because a plaintiff would have been entitled to 
a jury trial under the LMRA for benefits which arose before ERISA 
was enacted, Congress must also have intended a jury should "in 
similar fashion" be available for claims under § 502.33 In analogizing 
the plaintiff's claim to one brought under the LMRA, the court 
characterized the recovery action under § 502 as one at law "for 
damages flowing from an alleged breach of contract."34 
Several district courts and, arguably, one circuit have agreed 
with some of the reasoning adopted by the Stamps court and its 
construction of § 502.3S Beginning with the Seventh Circuit's decision 
29. Id. at 746-47. 
30. § 502(a)(3) provides that "[a] civil action may be brought ... by a participant, 
beneficiary, or fiduciary (A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates any 
provision of this subchapter or the terms of the plan, or (B) to obtain other 
appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such violations, or (ii) to enforce any 
provisions of this subchapter or the terms of the plan .... " 29 U.S.C. § 
1I32(a)(3) (1988). 
31. Stamps, 431 F. Supp. at 747. 
32. Id. (quoting H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 
1974 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 5038, 5107). 
33. Stamps, 431 F. Supp. at 747. 
34.Id. 
35. See, e.g., Pollock v." Castrovincini, 476 F. Supp. 606, aff'd without opinion, 
622 F.2d 575 (2d Cir. 1979) (following statutory construction propounded in 
Stamps in granting right to jury); Puz V. Bessemer Cement Co., 700 F. Supp . 
• 267 (W.O. Pa. 1988) (ERISA dispute that is contractual in nature and does 
not relate to trustee's use of discretion may be heard by a jury); Bower V. 
Bunker Hill Co., 114 F.R.D. 587 (E.D. Wash. 1986) (ERISA suit is contractual 
in nature and could be tried before a jury); Paladino V. Taxicab Indus. Pension 
Fund, 588 F. Supp. 37 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (expressly following the Stamps 
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in Wardle v. Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension 
Fund,36 however, the overwhelming majority of circuits addressing 
the issue have either expressly refused to follow the reasoning in 
Stamps or have followed WardleY 
The Stamps court argued that § 502(a)(1)(B) would be superflu-
ous in light of the language in § 502(a)(3). The majority of courts 
addressing the issue, however, have decided that treating claims 
brought under § 502(a)(1)(B) as equitable would not make § 502(a)(3) 
superfluous. For example, in Wardle, the Seventh Circuit stated: 
We must respectfully disagree with the reasoning of the 
Stamps court. . .. The specific types of claims enumerated 
in § 502(a)(1)(B) would still have to be separated in some 
manner from general equitable actions under § 502(a)(3) 
because Congress granted state courts concurrent jurisdiction 
. only over § 502(a)(1)(B) claims. Thus, the statutory scheme 
does not imply that § 502(a)(1)(B) claims are legal. 38 
Wardle and its progeny have also refused to follow the Stamps 
court's construction of the legislative history of ERISA as providing 
an action at law. These courts have determined that the legislative 
rationale); Bouton v. Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension 
Fund, B.N.A. Pens. Rep. No. 226, D-l (E.D. Tenn. 1978). But see Katsaros 
v. Cody, 744 F.2d 270 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1072 (1984) 
(explicitly refusing to follow Pollock). 
36. 627 F.2d 820, 828-30 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1112 (1981). The 
Seventh Circuit was the first federal court of appeals to decide the § 502 jury 
trial issue. 
37. See, e.g., In re Vorpahl, 695 F.2d 318, 321-22 (8th Cir. 1982) (expressly 
rejecting Stamps in favor of Wardle in holding that plaintiffs were not entitled 
to a jury trial for claims that retirement plan violated § 502 by denying 
employees present and future benefits); Calamia v. Spivey, 632 F.2d 1235, 
1236-37 (5th Cir. 1980) (expressly agreeing with Wardle's criticism of Stamps 
in holding that plaintiff was not entitled to have a jury hear § 502 claims for 
compensatory damages); see also Pane v. RCA Corp., 868 F.2d 631, 636-37 
(3d Cir. 1989) (citing with approval the decisions in Wardle, Calamia and 
Vorpahl in holding that no jury trial exists for employee suing his employer 
under § 502); Berry v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 761 F.2d 1003, 1006-07 (4th Cir. 
1985) (citing Wardle and Vorpahl with approval in holding that Congress did 
not intend for a jury trial right in a § 502 action); Blau v. Del Monte Corp., 
748 F.2d 1348, 1357 (9th Cir. 1984) (no statutory or constitutional right to 
jury exists in ERISA actions), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 865 (1985). See generally 
Note, The Right to Jury Trial in Enforcement Actions Under Section 502(aj(I)(B) 
of ERISA, 96 HARV. L. REv. 737 (1983); Note, The Right to a Jury Trial in 
ERISA Section 502(a)(l)(B) Actions: Wardle v. Central States, Southeast & 
Southwest Areas Pension Fund, 65 MINN. L. REv. 1208 (1981). 
38. Wardle, 627 F.2d at 829 (citations omitted); see also Vorpahl, 695 F.2d at 
321; Calamia, 632 F.2d at 1237; Pane v. RCA Corp., 667 F. Supp. 168, 174-
75 (D.N.J. 1987). 
1991] ERISA Benefit Recovery Actions 485 
history cited by Stamps merely indicates that Congress' intent was 
for federal courts to create a federal common law under § 502, much 
the same way that courts could establish a federal common law for 
claims arising under LMRA. The courts that follow Wardle distin-
guish claims under LMRA from claims under ERISA and argue that 
federal common law rights do not necessarily apply to ERISA claims.39 
2. Is a § 502 Claim More Like a Trust Action or an Action for 
Breach of Contract? 
Prior to 1989, another prevalent § 502 jury trial issue concerned 
whether a claim fell under the law of trusts, which historically has 
been treated as equitable, or whether the claim was more like a 
breach of contract with disputed questions of material fact that were 
more appropriate for a jury to resolve. The courts have shown far 
more division on this issue than on the issue of legislative intent 
addressed in Stamps. 
a. Breach of Trust Theory 
Federal courts have analogized the rights and remedies created 
by ERISA with those created under the law of trustS.40 In fact, the 
Supreme Court recently characterized ERISA as "abound[ing] with 
the language and terminology of trust law. "41 As the Third Circuit 
remarked in Turner v. CF&I Steel Corp. :42 
The remedies of trust beneficiaries against trustees or third 
parties are equitable rather than legal ... [w]e are persuaded 
that the [§ 502] remedy plaintiffs sought in the case at hand 
is equitable. The Supreme Court's pronouncement in Central 
States, Pension Fund v. Central Transport, Inc. - that the 
duties of plan trustees are to be examined under the common 
law of trusts - supports our conclusion that only equitable 
relief is available under § 502(a)(I)(B) of ERISA.43 
39. See, e.g., Wardle, 627 F.2d at 829; Vorpahl, 695 F.2d at 321; Calamia, 632 
F.2d at 1237. 
40. Under the common law of trusts, courts have almost uniformly held that 
proceedings to determine rights under employee benefit plans are equitable, 
and thus should be tried to a judge and not a jury. Berry v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 
761 F.2d 1003, 1007 (4th Cir. 1985); Wardle v. Central States, Southeast & 
Southwest Areas Pension Fund, 627 F.2d at 829 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 
419 U.S. 1112 (1981); Strout V. GTE Products Corp., 618 F. Supp. 444,445-
46 (D. Me. 1985). 
41. Firestone Tire and Rubber CO. V. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 110 (1989). 
42. 770 F.2d 43 (3d Cir. 1985). 
43. [d. at 47 (citations omitted). 
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The Turner court concluded that ERISA actions are similar to 
trust actions but held that litigants are entitled to a jury trial when 
money must be paid by the trustee "unconditionally and immedi-
ately."44 Moreover, the Supreme Court noted that "ERISA's legis-
. lative history confirms that the fiduciary responsibility provisions 
'codif[y] and mak[e] applicable to [ERISA] fiduciaries certain prin-
ciples developed in the evolution of the law of trustS."'4S Conse-
quently, some courts have concluded that, because the law of trusts 
has historically been considered equitable in character, Congress' 
silence on the jury trial right reflects an intention that ERISA suits 
must likewise be treated as arising in equity.46 
In support of the conclusion that a § 502 action is akin to an 
equitable action and should not be tried before a jury, courts have 
pointed to the standard of review utilized in trust actions; prior to 
1989, federal courts uniformly accepted the "arbitrary and capri-
cious" standard of review found in LMRAY Under this reasoning, 
courts will not set aside the decision of an ERISA fiduciary or 
administrator unless they find that such a decision was "arbitrary 
and capricious," not supported by substantial evidence, or erroneous 
on a question of law.48 Some of the federal courts that adopted the 
view that ERISA actions should be tried without a jury reasoned 
that the standard of review used in ERISA claims shows an intent 
that such cases are equitable.49 These courts have held that such a 
deferential standard of review "bespeaks a legislative scheme granting 
44. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 197-98 (1959). 
45. Firestone, 489 U.S. at 110 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 93-533, p.ll (1973». See 
generally ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1114 (1982 & Supp. 1987). 
46. Berry v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 761 F.2d 1003, 1007 (4th Cir. 1985); In re Vorpahl, 
695 F.2d 318, 321 (8th Cir. 1982) (concluding that § 502 lawsuits should be 
considered as equitable in character based on the law of trusts); Wardle v. 
Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund, 627 F.2d 820, 829 
(7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1112 (1981). 
47. Wardle, 627 F.2d at 823-24; Rehmar v. Smith, 555 F.2d 1362, 1371 (9th Cir. 
1976); Maness v. Williams, 513 F.2d 1264, 1265 (8th Cir. 1975); see Labor 
Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 186(c) (1988). 
48. Brown v. Retirement Comm. of Briggs & Stratton, 797 F.2d 521, 525 (7th Cir. 
1986). 
49. See, e.g., Chilton v. Savannah Foods & Ind., Inc., 814 F.2d 620,623-24 (11th 
Cir. 1987) (standard of review for both federal district courts and courts of 
appeal is limited in ERISA cases to the arbitrary and capricious standard); 
Turner v. CF&I Steel Corp., 770 F.2d 43, 46-47 (3d Cir. 1985) (limited scope 
of review over a trustees decision not compatible with the right to a jury trial); 
Berry v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 761 F.2d 1003, 1006-07 (4th Cir. 1985) (suits to 
determine rights under employee benefit plans are equitable in character); 
Calamia v. Spivey, 632 F.2d 1235 (5th Cir. 1980) (determination of whether 
pension fund acted arbitrarily and capriciously was traditionally performed by 
judges, not juries); Wardle, 627 F.2d at 829-30 (pension benefit suits are 
equitable in nature). 
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initial discretionary decision making to bodies other than the federal 
courts, with which federal jury trials have proved incompatible."50 
For example, in Berry v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. 51 the Fourth Circuit 
reversed a district court for improperly giving a matter to a jury that 
should have been decided by the court, stating: 
The district court used [the arbitrary and capricious) stan-
dard in its jury instructions .... It was error, however, for 
the judge to submit this matter to a jury. Whether a 
fiduciary has violated the arbitrary and capricious standard 
is a matter for the court. The significance of the standard, 
while second-nature to a judge, is not readily communicated 
to jurors.52 
The Fourth Circuit concluded that, because the limited scope of 
review was not compatible with the jury function, the plaintiff was 
not entitled to have a jury apply this standard. 53 The court also 
concluded that the limited scope of review was proof that Congress 
did not intend to give a § 502 litigant a jury trial right.54 
b. Breach of Contract Theory 
In contrast, other federal district courts have taken the analysis 
a step further and found an implied right to a jury trial. These courts 
have characterized the ERISA suit as one for breach of contract 
seeking damages,55 which is a traditional action at law triable to a 
jury.~ , 
An example of this approach is found in Bower v. Bunker Hill 
Co. 57 In Bower, present and future pensioners brought a class action 
against a corporation to obtain reinstatement of their medical insur-
ance and damages for wrongful termination of the insurance. The 
plaintiffs also brought a separate claim for breach of fiduciary duty. 
Jurisdiction was based on both § 502 and LMRA. In response, the 
corporation filed a motion to strike the plaintiffs' jury demand, 
arguing that the claims were "essentially equitable. "58 While the 
50. Wardle, 627 F.2d at 830; accord Chilton, 814 F.2d at 623-24; Turner, 770 
F.2d at 46; In re Vorpahl, 695 F.2d 318, 321 (8th Cir. 1982). 
51. 761 F.2d 1003 (4th Cir. 1985). 
52. Id. at 1006-07. 
53. Id. at 1007. 
54.Id. 
55. See, e.g., Abbarno v. Carborundum Co., 682 F. Supp. 179, 181-82 (W.D.N.Y. 
1988); Bower v. Bunker Hill Co., 114 F.R.D. 587, 597-98 (E.D. Wash. 1986); 
Paladino v. Taxicab Indus. Pension Fund, 588 F. Supp. 37, 39-41 (S.D.N.Y. 
1984). 
56. Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962). 
57. 114 F.R.D. 587, 598 (E.D. Wash. 1986). 
58. Id. at 597. 
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court granted the motion to strike on the breach of fiduciary duty 
claim, it held that the plaintiffs' other claims could be tried before 
a jury.59 Noting that the plaintiffs' claim for relief sought monetary 
damages, including money spent to obtain other medical coverage 
from the time that the plan had been terminated, the court concluded 
that the claim was similar to a claim for breach of contract.60 
In granting the plaintiffs a jury trial on counts for wrongful 
termination of the plan benefits, the Bower court, following the 
reasoning propounded by the Supreme Court in Dairy Queen. Inc. 
v. Wood,61 declared: . . 
§ 502(a)(1)(B) of ERISA provides that a beneficiary may 
bring an action for redress of violations of the terms of the 
plan. A suit for breach of contract seeking damages was 
traditionally an action at law and thus triable to a jury 
under the Seventh Amendment. Thus, the plaintiffs have a 
right to a jury determination of not only whether the 
contract has been breached and the extent of damages if 
any, but also just what the contract is.62 
Recognizing that its decision might appear facially inconsistent 
with Wardle, the Bower court distinguished Wardle by noting that 
"Wardle involved an [accounting) action brought by a beneficiary 
against the plan trustee to enforce payment of 'pension benefits" 
which is traditionally an equitable remedy. 63 Consequently, the court 
found that there was "no basis for equating the present action with 
those cases involving the discretionary refusal to pay benefits by a 
trustee interpreting an existing plan."64 
59.Id. 
60. Id. at 597-98. 
61. 369 U.S. 469 (1962). In Dairy Queen, plaintiff brought suit for the breach of 
a written licensing contract. The complaint sought injunctive relief and an 
award for damages in an amount to be determined from an accounting. In 
reversing the motion to strike granted by the district court, the Supreme Court 
noted that since the adoption of the Federal Rules, the right to a jury remained 
for all legal Claims, even where both legal and equitable relief are sought in 
the same case. The Court held that an action to collect a debt under a contract 
was "traditionally legal." Id. at 477. 
62. Bower v. Bunker Hill Co., 114 F.R.D. 587, 598 (E.D. Wash. 1986) (citations 
omitted). 
63. Id. The reasoning of the Bower court is not entirely correct. In fact, the 
plaintiff in Wardle sued for $92,400 in "compensatory damages" (plaintiff's 
estimate as to the amount of benefits that would have accrued during his 
lifetime), punitive damages, attorney's fees, costs, and "all other just and 
proper relief." Wardle v. Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension 
Fund, 627 F.2d 820, 823 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1112 (1981). 
64. Bower, 114 F.R.D. at 598. In a footnote, the court extended its holding even 
further when it stated, "[e)ven if this case could be analogized to Wardle, it 
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The decision in Bower has supplied several methods for plaintiffs 
to plead a § 502 cause of action which would support a jury trial 
demand: first, by fashioning a complaint for wrongful termination 
of or interference with an· employee benefits plan as a claim for 
breach of contract; second, by disputing or questioning the meaning 
of one or more material provisions of the benefits plan; third, by 
questioning the intent of the parties at the time they entered into the 
employee benefits plan; and finally, by requesting relief for compen-
satory and punitive damages resulting from the alleged breach.65 A 
number of federal district courts, as well as one circuit court (albeit 
in dicta), have similarly held that certain actions brought under § 
502 were contractual and could be tried to a jury. 66 
B. The Seventh Amendment Right To a Jury Trial 
If the right to a jury trial does not exist as an implied right 
based upon the intent of the legislative body, the analysis turns on 
whether the seventh amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides such a right. The seventh amendment preserves the right to 
a jury trial in suits "at common law. "67 The phrase "common law" 
would not alter the conclusion that I reach today at least as to present 
pensioners. Plaintiff present pensioners allege that they have met all of the 
requirements of eligibility to medical benefits required under the plan. As far 
as their claim for damages is concerned, it more closely resembles an action 
to force payment of money immediately and unconditionally due. Such actions 
have traditionally been construed as being legal." Id. at n.6 (citations omitted). 
65. See Id. at 598; International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace & Agri-
cultural Implement Workers v. Yard-Man, Inc., 716 F.2d 1476 (6th Cir. 1983), 
cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1007 (1984). 
66. See Transamerica Occidental Life Ins. CO. V. DiGregorio, 811 F.2d 1249, 1251 
n.2 (9th Cir. 1987) (dicta) (issue relating to the interpretation of an insurance 
policy was contractual in nature; thus, the beneficiary could have demanded a 
jury trial had the case been tried); Puz V. Bessemer Cement Co., 700 F. Supp. 
267, 268 (W.O. Pa. 1988) ("Although the present case does involve some 
issues, such as the breach of fiduciary duty claims, which must be tried by the 
court .. , the initial question and major issue in the case is contractual in 
nature and involves factual ambiguities relating to the interpretation of the 
termination provisions contained in the various agreements. Accordingly, the 
court concludes that the plaintiffs are entitled to have these factual ambiguities 
resolved by a jury. "); Paladino V. Taxicab Indus. Pension Fund, 588 F. Supp. 
37,39 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) ("[B]eneath this seemingly "equitable" issue [of having 
the court review the exercise of fiduciary power by a plan trustee], there lurks 
a simple question: whether plaintiff had a break in his service in the taxicab 
industry which forfeited his prior service credit. This represents a pure question 
of fact ... particularly appropriate for resolution by a trial jury.") 
67. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. The seventh amendment has not been made binding 
on the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. See 
Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Cole, 251 U.S. 54, 56 (1919) (dicta). 
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in the seventh amendment is used to contrast cases in equity, admir-
alty, and maritime law. 68 
The Supreme Court has asserted that the right to a trial by jury 
guaranteed by the seventh amendment is a fundamental right of the 
people69 which will be "guarded by the court with jealousy."7o This 
view was reaffirmed by the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, which provide that, "the right to a trial by jury as 
declared by the Seventh Amendment . . . shall be preserved to the 
parties inviolate. "71 
The seventh amendment's reference to "suits at common law" 
is not limited to actions traditionally tried in the law courts of 
England in 1791, but includes suits in which legal rights are to be 
"ascertained and determined."72 The Supreme Court has further held 
that this analysis not only applies to common law forms of action, 
but also to causes of action created by congressional enactments, 
even where the action created was unheard of at common law. 73 
The Supreme Court in Tull v. United States74 set forth factors 
for courts to consider in determining the "legal nature" of an issue. 
These factors include the custom of dealing with such questions 
before the merger of the courts of law and equity and the remedy 
sought. 7S The Court emphasized that the second factor is more 
important than the first. 76 A third factor to consider when determining 
whether the seventh amendment confers a jury trial right is the 
practical abilities and limitations of juries.77 
68. Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. 433, 446 (1830). In Parsons, the Court noted that 
the distinction between these types of actions was present in the framers' minds 
when they drafted the amendment. Thus, the Court concluded that the scope 
of the "common law" was not limited to those types of suits which the 
common law recognized among its "old and settled proceedings," but also 
included suits in which legal rights were determined and legal remedies admin-
istered. Id. at 447. 
69. Jacob v. New York City, 315 U.S. 752 (1942). 
70. Baylis v. Travelers Ins. Co., 113 U.S. 316 (1885). 
71. FED. R. CIY. P. 38(a). 
72. Parsons, 28 U.S. at 447. 
73. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 193 (1974). 
74. 481 U.S. 412 (f987). See generally Note, Tull v. United States: Jury Trial 
Required in Statutory Civil Penalty Actions, 1988 UTAH L. REV. 435. 
75. Tull, 481 U.S. at 417-18. 
76. Id. at 421. 
77. Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 n.l0 (1970). As noted in Tull, however, 
the Court has never relied on this consideration "as an independent basis for 
extending the right to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment." Tull, 481 
U.S. at 418 n.4 (1987). Additionally, the Court may have severely restricted 
the viability of this step when it noted in Granjinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 
492 U.S. 33, 41 (1989), that the consideration of whether the action is 
appropriate for a jury is only relevant in determining whether Congress 
permissibly delegated certain adjudications to administrative agencies, and 
whether the jury trial would impair the functioning of the legislative scheme. 
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Prior to 1989, few courts found claims brought under § 502 
conferred a seventh amendment jury trial right. 78 The courts that 
ultimately denied the right to a jury trial based on the seventh 
amendment provided little discussion of the governing principles 
announced by the Supreme Court. For example, in Blau v. Del 
Monte Corp., 79 the Ninth Circuit relegated its entire analysis of the 
plaintiff's constitutional right to a jury trial to a single sentence when 
it summarily stated "[n]or is there an independent constitutional or 
statutory right to jury trial in ERISA actions."so 
Similarly, in In re Vorpahl,81 the Eighth Circuit, after rejecting 
the claim that the right to a jury trial was implied by § 502, dismissed 
petitioner's constitutional claim that the seventh amendment granted 
him a jury trial. In so doing, the court held: 
The right to a jury trial under the seventh amendment 
depends on the nature of the issue to be tried. Traditionally, 
claims for present and future pension benefits . . . have 
been viewed as equitable in nature and triable by a court. 
As we observed earlier [in the discussion of whether ERISA 
impliedly gave the right to jury trial], Congress intended to 
preserve this view when it enacted section 502 of ERISA. 
The mere fact that plaintiffs pray for monetary relief in 
part does not mandate that this action be characterized as 
legal rather than equitable. 82 
78. See, e.g., In re Vorpahl, 695 F.2d 318, 322 (8th Cir. 1982) (no constitutional 
right to a jury trial in § 502 actions); Wardle v. Central States, Southeast & 
Southwest Areas Pension Fund, 627 F.2d 820, 830 n.21 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. 
denied, 449 U.S. 1112 (1981) ("In light of our conclusion above that this claim 
is equitable, no further discussion is necessary to reject [plaintiff's] constitu-
tional argument."); Whitt v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 676 F. Supp. 1119, 
1133 (N.D. Ala. 1987) (supplementary memorandum opinion) ("The Eleventh 
Circuit either has not yet been called upon to address, or has not addressed, 
the Seventh Amendment when comparing ERISA claims which are kin to 
traditional common law claims and ERISA claims which are like those formerly 
dealt with by the chancellor."), rev'd, Amos v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Ala., 
868 F.2d 430 (lith Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 855 (1989); Paladino v. 
Taxicab Indus. Pension Fund, 588 F. Supp. 37, 39 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (summarily 
agreeing with defendants that "there is no Seventh Amendment right to jury 
trial in ERISA actions"). But see, Bower v. Bunker Hill Co., 114 F.R.D. 587, 
597-98 (E.D. Wash. 1986) (plaintiff's § 502 claim is akin to a claim for breach 
of contract, which is traditionally legal; thus, the constitution guarantees 
plaintiff's right to a jury trial). 
79. 748 F.2d 1348 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 865 (1985). 
80. [d. at 1357. 
81. 695 F.2d at 322. 
82. [d. at 322 (citations omitted); See a/so Pane v. RCA Corp., 868 F.2d 631, 636 
(3d Cir. 1989) (benefits under § 502 are equitable in nature; therefore, plaintiff 
is not entitled to a jury trial). 
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Some of the federal courts analyzing the § 502 jury trial issue 
have given at least minimal consideration to the seventh amendment 
issue before denying a jury trial request. Other courts, however, have 
been silent on the constitutional question, relying entirely on implied 
statutory grounds in concluding that no jury right exists. 83 
Those courts which expressly addressed the seventh amendment 
in the ERISA context prior to the 1989 Supreme Court decisions in 
Firestone Tire & Rubber Ce'. v. Bruch84 and Granfinanciera, S.A. v. 
Nordberg,8S as well as the later Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers, 
Local 391 v. TerryM decision, have generally maintained that there 
is no constitutional guarantee of a right to a jury trial in cases under 
§ 502.87 Moreover, while few courts found an implied statutory right 
to a jury trial in a § 502 action, not all of those courts similarly 
found that a constitutional guarantee of a right to a jury trial existed 
in the absence of the legislative intent embodied in the statute. For 
example, in Paladino v. Taxicab Industry Pension Fund,88 the court 
began its discussion on whether plaintiff was entitled to a jury trial 
by "agreeing with the defendants that there is no seventh amendment 
right to jury trial in [all] ERISA actions," and viewing those actions 
as "essentially equitable in nature. "89 
In § 502 cases where a jury trial right has been found, some of 
the opinions are vague as to whether the right was preserved based 
on legislative intent grounds or on seventh amendment grounds. For 
example, although the district court in Abbarno v. Carborundum 
CO.,90 did not address the seventh amendment, it nonetheless appeared 
to be applying the constitutional standard when it held: 
In the present case, . . . plaintiffs bring an ERISA claim 
that does not seek equitable relief. Rather they seek an 
83. See, e.g., Pane v. RCA Corp., 868 F.2d 631 (3d Cir. 1989) (no discussion of 
the seventh amendment in denying plaintiff's prayer for a jury); Chilton v. 
Savannah Foods & Indus., Inc. 814 F.2d 620 (11th Cir. 1987) (no discussion 
of the constitutional right to a jury trial); Berry v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 761 F.2d 
1003 (4th Cir. 1985) (no discussion of the constitutional right to a jury trial); 
Calamia v. Spivey, 632 F.2d 1235 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding only that ERISA 
does not entitle plaintiff's to a jury trial). But see Cox v. Keystone Carbon 
Co., 861 F.2d 390, 394 (3d Cir. 1988) (remanding plaintiff's claim to examine 
the substance of the pleadings and determine whether plaintiff had pleaded a 
cause of action under § 502, and, if so, to decide if the seventh amendment 
entitled him to a jury trial). 
84. 489 U.S. 101 (1989). 
85. 492 U.S. 33 (1989). 
86. 494 U.S. 558 (1990). 
87. See supra notes 78-83 and accompanying text. 
88. 588 F. Supp. 37, 39 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). 
89. Id. The court went on to find that Congress nevertheless intended to grant a 
litigant the right to a trial by jury. Id. 
90. 682 F. Supp. 179 (W.D.N.Y. 1988). 
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award for damages for nonpayment of benefits. . . . The 
plaintiffs' claim being essentially legal in nature, it is wholly 
appropriate for them to request a trial by jury. 91 
493 
One case that specifically did employ the seventh amendment as 
a basis for granting an ERISA jury trial right is Bower v. Bunker 
Hill CO.92 In Bower, the court cited the three part test developed by 
the Supreme Court,93 and agreed with plaintiff's seventh amendment 
argument that because the ERISA claim asserted was similar to a 
breach of contract action for damages, the plaintiffs had a consti-
tutional right to a trial by jury.94 
C. Summary of the Law Prior to 1989 
Prior to 1989, a majority of the federal courts considering the 
§ 502 jury trial issue had concluded that there is neither a statutory 
nor constitutional basis for granting a § 502 litigant a jury trial. 
Additionally, a minority of courts that did grant a jury trial were 
more comfortable relying upon legislative intent grounds rather than 
the seventh amendment. In light of several recent Supreme Court 
decisions, however, litigants seeking a jury trial in an ERISA action 
may have an easier time supporting their jury request on constitu-
tional grounds. 
IV. THE SUPREME COURT'S RECENT POSITION ON 
STANDARD OF REVIEW IN ERISA ACTIONS AND THE 
SEVENTH AMENDMENT 
In three recent decisions, the Supreme Court both changed the 
standard of review used in § 502 actions and reaffirmed the scope 
of the seventh amendment's preservation of the jury trial right in 
cases brought under federal statutes that are silent on the jury trial 
issue. 
A. The ERISA Standard of Review: Firestone Tire and Rubber 
Co. v. Bruch 
In Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch,9s plaintiffs, employees 
of a division of Firestone Tire and Rubber Company ("Firestone"), 
sued Firestone under § 502 to recover severance benefits allegedly 
due when Firestone sold the division to another company. Firestone 
91. [d. at 181-82. 
92. 114 F.R.D. 587 (E.D. Wash. 1986). 
93. [d. at 597-98 (citing Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962». 
94. [d. See supra notes 56-66 and accompanying text. 
95. 489 U.S. 101 (1989). 
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had denied plaintiffs' request on the grounds that there had not been 
a reduction in work force that would authorize benefits under the 
terms of the plan. 96 
The district court granted Firestone's motion for summary judg-
ment on the grounds that the company had not breached its fiduciary 
duty and that its decision was not arbitrary or capricious.97 The 
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, holding that where 
an employer itself is a fiduciary and administrator of an unfunded 
benefit plan, the employer's decision to deny benefits should be 
subject to a de novo standard of review, and not an arbitrary and 
capricious standard. 98 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed the Third 
Circuit's holding as to the appropriate standard of review.99 The 
Court held that although it was Jhe "general intent" of Congress to 
incorporate in ERISA much of the fiduciary law of LMRA, the 
arbitrary and capricious standard of review developed under LMRA 
should not be adopted "wholesale" and applied to claims brought 
under § 502.100 In distinguishing ERISA from LMRA, the Court 
stated: 
Unlike the LMRA, ERISA explicitly authorizes suits against 
fiduciaries and plan administrators to remedy statutory viol-
ations, including breaches of fiduciary duty and lack of 
compliance with benefit plans. Thus, the [reason be-
hind]. . . the LMRA arbitrary and capricious standard-the 
need for a jurisdictional basis in suits against trustees-is not 
present in ERISA. Without this jurisdictional analogy, LMRA 
principles offer no support for the adoption of the arbitrary 
and capricious standard insofar as [§ 502] is concerned. 101 
The Court held that a de novo standard of review would apply to 
plaintiff's § 502 claims, "regardless of whether the plan at issue is 
funded or unfunded and regardless of whether the administrator or 
fiduciary is operating under a possible or actual conflict of interest. "102 
Despite preference for a de novo standard of review, the Court 
indicated one instance when an arbitrary and capricious standard 
would still apply in § 502 actions. According to the Court, the 
arbitrary and capricious standard would apply if the benefit plan 
96. Id. at 105. 
97. Bruch v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 640 F. Supp. 519 (E.D. Pa. 1986), 
a/I'd in part, 828 F.2d 134 (3d Cir. 1987). 
98. 828 F.2d 134 (3d Cir. 1987). 
99. Firestone, 489 U.S. at 108. 
100. Id. at 109. 
101. Id. at 110 (citations omitted). 
102. Id. at liS. 
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expressly gives the plan administrator or fiduciary discretionary au-
thority to either construe the terms of the plan or determine eligibility 
for plan benefits. 103 
The Court rejected Firestone's argument that plan interpretation 
is an "inherently discretionary function," precluding the requirement 
that the plan's terms grant the trustee authority to interpret the plan's 
provisions. Instead, the Court analogized the judiciary's role in 
construing terms of trust agreements to their role in construing terms 
of contracts. I04 In the Court's view, actions which challenged an 
employer's denial of benefits before ERISA was enacted were gov-
erned by the law of contracts. lOS Thus, the terms of trusts that are 
created by written instruments must be "determined by the provisions 
of the instrument as interpreted in light of all the circumstances. "106 
as construed by the court, and "without deferring to either party's 
interpretation." 107 
B. The Supreme Court's Recent Position on the Seventh 
Amendment Right to a Jury Triai: Granfinanciera, S.A. v. 
Nordberg and Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers, Local 391 v. 
Terry 
1. Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg 
In Granjinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg,l08 the plaintiff, a bank-
ruptcy trustee for the Chase & Sanborn Corporation (' 'Chase and 
Sanborn"),I09 filed suit in the district court against Granfinanciera, 
103. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 112-13 (1989). This 
exception may have swallowed the rule since, as a matter of course in light of 
Firestone, nearly all new ERISA governed benefit plans now include language 
which provides for administrator discretion. J:lint, Jr., ERISA: The Arbitrary 
and Capricious Rule Under Siege, 39 CATH. U. L. REv. 133, 136 (1989). See 
generally Beaver, The Standard of Review in ERISA Benefits Denial Cases 
After Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch: Revolution or Deja Vu, TORT & 
INSURANCE L.J. 1 (Fall 1990) ("At least one lesson from Bruch is obvious: 
Plan sponsors and drafters should craft new plans, and review and amend 
existing ones, to incorporate this elective deferential review of benefit claims 
decisions.' '). 
104. Firestone, 489 U.S. at 112. 
105. Id. 
106. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 4, Comment d (1959». 
107. [d. 
108. 492 U.S. 33 (1989). 
109. [d. at 36. Chase and Sanborn was undergoing a reorganization proceeding 
under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174 (1982 & 
Supp. V). 
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S.A. and Medex, Ltda. IIO In this suit, the trustee alleged that the 
defendants had fraudulently received funds from Chase & Sanborn's 
corporate predecessor within one year of the date that its bankruptcy 
petition was filed without receiving consideration. III The trustee sought 
to avoid these allegedly fraudulent conveyances and to recover dam-
ages for constructive and actual fraud, as well as interest, costs and 
expenses, as allowed under the Bankruptcy Code. 1I2 
The district court referred the proceedings to the bankruptcy 
court, and both defendants requested a jury trial "on all issues so 
triable. "113 The bankruptcy court denied defendant's request, reason-
ing that a suit to recover a fraudulent transfer was "a core action 
that originally, under the English common law ... was a non-jury 
issue."114 After a bench trial in which monetary damages were 
assessed against both defendants on the fraud claim, the district court 
affirmed the bankruptcy court without discussing defendants' claim 
that they had a right to a jury trial. lls 
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. 1I6 In 
affirming, the court held that defendants lacked a right to a jury 
trial under the statute because the provision of law under which suit 
was brought contained no express grant of a jury trial right. 117 
Additionally, the Eleventh Circuit held that the seventh amendment 
did not preserve the jury trial right because actions to recover 
fraudulent transfers were "equitable in nature, even when a plaintiff 
seeks only monetary relief," and further, because "bankruptcy pro-
ceedings are inherently equitable."118 
The Supreme Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit on seventh 
amendment grounds. In doing so, the Court applied long established 
rules for analyzing the constitutional right to a jury trial and noted 
that, of these standards, the examination of the remedy sought is 
more important than trying to find an 18th-century English common 
law analogy.1I9 
Nonetheless, in comparing the statutory action at issue to 18th-
century actions brought in the courts of England, Justice Brennan, 
110. Id. at 36-37. Granfinanciera w~s a bank located in Bogota, Colombia. After 
being served with the plaintiff's complaint, the government of Colombia 
nationalized Granfinanciera. The opinion does not discuss whether Medex 
Ltda. is also a Colombian corporation. 
111. Granjinanciera, 492 U.S. at 36. 
112. Id. 
113. Id. at 36-37. 
114. Id. at 37. 
115. Id. 
116. Re Chase & Sanborn Corp., 835 F.2d 1341 (lith Cir. 1988). 
117. Id. at 1348. 
118. Id. at 1349. 
119. Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33,42 (l989). 
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writing for the majority, found that the historical practice in England 
to recover funds from a fraudulent conveyance were often brought 
in the courts of law, and that had the plaintiff in Granfinanciera 
brought suit in 1791 in England, a court of law, not equity, would 
have adjudicated it. l20 The Court also concluded that the nature of 
the relief requested, that is, monetary damages, "strongly supports 
our preliminary finding that the right [plaintiff] invokes should be 
denominated legal rather than equitable." 121 The Court found that 
the relief of monetary damages of a fixed amount in this case could 
not go forward in equity because an adequate remedy was available 
at law. According to the Court, the rule favoring actions at law 
"serves to guard the right of trial by jury preserved by the seventh 
amendment and to that end it should be liberally construed."122 
Even more astonishing than the Court's liberal construction of. 
the seventh amendment was the fact that the parties in Granfinanciera 
were litigating their case in bankruptcy court, assigned to non-Article 
III judges sitting without juries. The Court, however, disregarded 
this fact and asserted that Congress' assignment of such actions to 
an administrative agency could not be used to justify denying a 
jury.123 Specifically, the Court rejected the notion that jury trials 
could not be had because "bankruptcy proceedings have been placed 
in an 'administrative forum with which the jury would be incom-
patible. '" 124 
2. Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers, Local 391 v. Terry 
A recent Supreme Court opinion concerning the seventh amend-
ment's preservation of the jury trial right in an action arising under 
a federal statute is Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers, Local 391 v. 
Terry.125 In Terry, employees sued both their employer and union 
for injunctive relief and monetary damages, alleging that the employer. 
had breached their collective bargaining agreement in violation of 
120. [d. at 42-43. 
121. [d. at 47. 
122. [d. at 48 (quoting Schoenthal v. Irving Trust Co., 287 U.S. 92, 94 (1932». 
123. [d. at 51-52. The majority did note in dicta that Congress could permissibly 
deny a jury trial in an administrative adjudication "in cases where 'public 
rights' are litigated." [d. at 51. The term "public right" was defined by the 
Court as involving "the Government and persons subject to its authority in 
connection with the performance of the constitutional functions of the executive 
or legislative departments." Id. at 51 n.8 (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 
U.S. 22 (1932». 
124. Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 61-62 (1989). In dissent, Justice 
White severely criticized the majority's approach as failing to consider the 
forum that the dispute is to be heard in as an element of the seventh amendment 
analysis. [d. at 79-84 (White, J., dissenting). 
125. 494 U.S. 558 (1990). 
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the LMRA and that the union had violated its duty of fair represen-
tation. 126 Subsequently, the employees' suit against the employer was 
voluntarily dismissed after the employer filed for bankruptcy. The 
union, however, still facing a claim for breach of its duty to represent, 
moved to strike the plaintiffs' jury demand. 127 The district court 
denied the motion to strike, asserting that, because plaintiffs had 
asserted legal rights and remedies, the seventh amendment preserved 
their right to a jury trial. I28 On interlocutory appeal, the Fourth 
Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court had correctly upheld 
the plaintiffs' jury trial right on the issues of declaratory judgment 
relief and damages. 129 . 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and, in an opinion written 
by Justice Marshall, affirmed the judgment of the Fourth Circuit. 130 
In so doing, the Court recognized that because the plaintiffs' claim 
against the union was only inferred from and not expressed in the 
LMRA, the analysis of the statute for any expressed or implied jury 
trial provisions contained therein was "unavailing." 131 Given this, 
th~ Court focused its analysis on the seventh amendment.132 
In comparing the claim before it to 18th-century actions brought 
in England, the Court discussed the Union's argument that a claim 
for breach of duty of fair representation was comparable to an action 
brought by trust beneficiaries for breach of fiduciary duty, which 
were exclusively within the jurisdiction of the equity courts. 133 Al-
though persuaded that the Union's analogy to the law of trusts 
extended to suits brought against a union by its members, six 
members of the Court nevertheless agreed that, "the trust analogy 
does not persuade us to characterize [the Union's] claim as wholly 
equitable."134 Instead, the Court stated that "[t]he Seventh Amend-
ment question depends on the nature of the issue to be tried rather 
than the character of the overall action."13s The Court reasoned that, 
because the plaintiffs were required to first prove the legal issue of 
126. [d. at 562 n.1. The Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 provides for 
suits by and against labor unions for violation of the union contract with the 
employer. LMRA § 301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1982). 
127. Terry v. Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers, Local 391, 676 F. Supp. 659, 661 
(M.D.N.C. 1987). 
128. [d. 
129. Terry v. Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers, Local 391, 863 F.2d 334 (4th Cir. 
1988). 
130. 494 U.S. 558 (1990). 
131. [d. at 564 n.3. 
132. [d. at 564-65. 
133. [d. at 568-69. 
134. [d. at 569. 
135. Terry v. Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers, Local 391, 494 U.S. 558, 569 (1990) 
(emphasis in original) (quoting Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531 (1970». 
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whether the employer had violated the LMRA before proving the 
"equitable issue" of whether the union breached its duty of fair 
representation, the plaintiffs' action against the union encompassed 
both legal and equitable issues. 136 The Court concluded that "[t]he 
first part of our Seventh Amendment inquiry, then, leaves us in 
equipoise as to whether [plaintiffs] are entitled to a jury trial."l37 
In the second step of the analysis, the Court considered the 
remedy sought by the employees, noting that the remedy consisted 
of an award of money for lost wages and benefits and that the 
"general rule" was that such relief was "the traditional form of 
relief offered in the courts of law."13s Consequently, the Court held: 
[B]ecause we conclude that the remedy [plaintiffs] seek has 
none of the attributes that must be present before we will 
find an exception to the general rule and characterize dam-
ages as equitable, we find that the remedy sought by [plain-
tiffs] is legal.139 
The "attributes" of monetary relief which the Court referred to as 
possibly being "equitable" included: (1) restitutionary damages such 
as in "action[s] for disgorgement of improper profits,"I40 and (2) a 
monetary award that is "incidental to or entwined with injunctive 
relief. "141 
In dissent, Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices O'Connor and 
Scalia, believed that an award of back pay is an equitable remedy 
because it is closely analogous to damages awarded to beneficiaries 
for a trustee's breach of trust.l 42 The majority criticized this view 
because it would render dispositive that part of the seventh amend-
ment analysis analogizing claims to 18th-century English claims.143 In 
the majority's view, such a result would be contrary to earlier law 
which defines the nature of the relief requested as "more important 
to the Seventh Amendment determination. "144 In a concurring opin-
ion, Justice Brennan posited that he would do away altogether with 
136. [d. at 569. 
137. [d. at 570. 
138. [d. at 570 (quoting Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 181, 196 (1974». 
139. [d. at 570. 
140. [d. The Court concluded that the back pay sought by the plaintiffs was not 
money wrongfully held by the defendant, but wages and benefits that they 
would have received from their employer had the defendant not breached its 
duty of fair representation. Thus, the relief sought was not, in the Court's 
view, restitution. [d. at 571-72. 
141. [d. at 571. The Court held that because the plaintiffs had only sought money 
damages, "this characteristic is clearly absent from this case." [d. at 571. 
142. [d. at 586-88 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
143. [d. at 571 n.8. 
144. [d. 
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the 18th-century analogy test, and would instead "decide Seventh 
Amendment questions on the basis of the relief sought. "145 
V. THE CURRENT STATE OF THE § 502 JURY TRIAL 
ISSUE 
A. The Impact oj Firestone 
The change in the standard of review mandated by the Supreme 
Court in Firestone has been followed by one federal district court as 
support for granting a jury trial in a § 502 action. In Vicinanzo v. 
Brunshwig & Fils, Inc., 146 the plaintiff was insured under a group 
insurance policy when she became permanently disabled. Several years 
after coverage under the major medical portion of this policy began, 
the policy was terminated. 147 The plaintiff filed suit under § 502 
challenging the cancellation and defendants (both her employer and 
insurance company) moved to strike the demand for a jury trial. The 
defendants argued that the plaintiff's claim was equitable in nature 
and that the statutory scheme did not imply a jury right. 148 
In rejecting the motion to strike, the district court relied in part 
upon the Firestone decision. The court did not cite Firestone, how-
ever, as supporting the implied statutory right to a jury trial. I49 On 
the contrary, the court stated: 
Quite apart from the implied statutory right to a jury trial 
. . . recent Supreme Court jurisprudence in the area of 
ERISA . . . implies that contests over the meaning of am-
biguous plan provisions - the resolution of which often 
results in the recovery of money damages or a declaration 
as to whether money will be recovered in the future - more 
closely resemble legal than equitable claims. ISO 
145. Id. at 574 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). Justice 
Brennan added that given that over the past 15 years, the Court has explained 
that the two parts of the seventh amendment test are unequally weighted, 
"there remains little purpose to our rattling through dusty attics of ancient 
writs." Id. at 575. 
146. 739 F. Supp. 882 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). 
147. Id. at 883. 
148. /d. 
149. Following its own pre-Firestone decision in Paladino v. Taxicab Indus. Pension 
Fund, 588 F. Supp. 37 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), the court declared that "it was the 
intent of Congress that ERISA plan enforcement actions be regarded as legal 
in nature, and that litigants be entitled to a jury trial." Vicinanzo, 739 F. 
Supp. at 885. 
150. Vicinanzo, 739 F. Supp. at 890. 
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In reaching its decision, the Vicin~nzo court read Firestone as holding 
that contests over the interpretation of vague plan provisions more 
closely resemble actions at law,lsi and under such circumstances the 
right to a jury is preserved by the seventh amendment. 152 
In contrast to the position taken by the Vicinanzo court, other 
courts that have addressed the § 502 issue, including one circuit 
court, have rejected the proposition that the Firestone change in the 
standard of review supports the right to a jury trial. I53 For example, 
in Blake v. Unionmutual Stock Life Insurance CO.,154 beneficiaries 
to a group health insurance plan brought suit to recover compensation 
allegedly owed by the insurer. The plaintiffs were denied a jury trial 
and appealed. On appeal the beneficiaries argued, based upon Fire-
stone, that the change in the standard of review from arbitrary and 
capricious to de novo "converts the claim from an equitable claim 
to a breach of contract action, which entitles them to a jury trial 
under the Seventh Amendment." ISS 
The Eleventh Circuit disagreed, holding that the plaintiffs' § 502 
action was still equitable notwithstanding the requested monetary 
relief. ls6 The court characterized the plaintiffs' request for money 
damages as "the benefits they are allegedly entitled to under the 
plan."ls7 While admitting that, since medical treatment had already 
been completed, an award of money "would satisfy [p]laintifrs 
demands," the court nevertheless opined that "if the claimant were 
still under treatment, only an order for continuing benefits would be 
sufficient. "158 The court concluded that such a judicial order would 
amount to "traditionally equitable relief." IS9 , 
Similarly, in Quesinberry v. Individual Banking Group Accident 
Insurance Plan l60 the court rejected the Firestone argument. In Ques-
inberry, plaintiff argued that Firestone called into doubt earlier cases 
holding against a § 502 jury trial right. 161 The plaintiff further argued 
that Firestone had invalidated the reasoning of the Fourth Circuit's 
151. [d. 
152. See id. at 890-91. 
153. See, e.g., Blake v. Unionmutual Stock Life IilS. Co., 906 F.2d 1525 (11th Cir. 
1990); Quesinberry v. Individual Banking Group Ins. Plan, 737 F. Supp. 38 
(W.O. Va. 1990); Pardini v. Southern Nevada Culinary & Bartenders Pension 
Plan & Trust, 733 F. Supp. 1402 (D. Nev. 1990). 
154. 906 F.2d 1525 (lith Cir. 1990). 




159. [d. Blake v. Unionmutual Stock Life Ins. Co., 906 F.2d 1525, 1526 (11th Cir. 
1990). 
160. 737 F. Supp. 38 (W.O. Va. 1990). 
161. [d. at 41. 
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decision in Berry v. Ciba-Geigy Corp.,162 which had held that a jury 
trial should be denied because jurors were not capable of applying 
the arbitrary and capricious standard. 163 The Quesinberry court, 
however, rejected this reasoning. The court correctly noted that the 
Fourth Circuit in Berry had given more than one reason for its 
decision to deny a jury right: 
the Court in Berry also cited the common law of trusts as 
support for its decision, stating that "[c]ourts addressing 
this issue have almost uniformly held that under the common 
law of trusts proceedings to determine rights under employee 
benefit plans are equitable in nature, and thus a matter for 
a judge, not a jury."I64 
The lower court's treatment of the Firestone change in the 
standard of review has not resulted in any sweeping changes to a § 
502 litigant's right to a jury trial. The few district courts that have 
discussed the ERISA jury trial in light of Firestone continue to deny 
a jury right on implied statutory grounds. These courts have reasoned 
that earlier decisions which found no implied statutory right to a § 
502 jury trial were grounded' on more than just the arbitrary and 
capricious standard of review. Firestone's impact on the seventh 
amendment right to a § 502 jury trial has been equally unavaIling. 
To date, only one district court has cited Firestone's change in the 
standard of review as lending constitutional support to a jury right. 
Consequently, at this juncture Firestone has had minimal impact on 
the litigant's jury trial right under § 502. 
B. The Impact of Granfinanciera and Terry 
While Firestone has not caused widespread revision in the federal 
courts' position that ERISA does not impliedly grant a jury trial, a 
number of courts have relied on the Granfinanciera and Terry 
decisions in extending a jury trial right under the seventh,amendment 
to § 502 claims. Various district courts, including several district 
courts within the Eleventh Circuit, have embraced either Granfinan-
ciera or Terry, or both, in holding that a constitutional right to a 
jury trial exists in § 502 actions .165 The Eleventh Circuit is the only 
162. 761 F.2d 1003 (4th Cir. 1985). 
163. 737 F. Supp. at 41. 
164. [d.; accord Pardini v. Southern Nevada Culinary & Bartenders Pension Plan 
& Trust, 733 F. Supp. 1402 (D. Nev. 1990) (recognizing that the earlier circuit 
court decisions against giving a jury trial right relied in part on the arbitrary 
and capricious standard of review). 
165. See, e.g., Weber v. Jacobs Mfg. Co., 751 F. Supp. 21 (D. Conn. 1990); 
Rhodes v. Piggly Wiggly Ala. Distrib. Co., 741 F. Supp. 1542 (N.D. Ala. 
1990); Vicinanzo v. Brunschwig & Fils, Inc., 739 F. Supp. 882 (S.D.N.Y. 
1990); Gangitano v. NN Investors Life Ins. Co., 733 F. Supp. 342 (S.D. Fla. 
1990); Jordan v. Reliable Life Ins. Co., 716 F. Supp 582 (N.D. Ala. 1989). 
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federal appellate court which has addressed the seventh amendment 
§ 502 jury trial issue in light of Granjinanciera and Terry. 166 
One court which has interpreted Granjinanciera and Terry in 
the § 502 context is the U.S. District Court for the Southern District 
of Florida. In· Gangitano v. NN Investors Life Insurance CO.,167 
plaintiffs filed a claim with defendant insurer to recover $850,000 
for medical treatment arising from a brain stem hemorrhage. Defen-
dant denied the claim, asserting that the hemorrhage was the result 
of a pre-existing medical condition. l68 Plaintiffs then sued under § 
502 . to recover medical insurance benefits allegedly owed under a 
policy issued by defendant and sought a jury trial. I69 
In granting the plaintiffs' request for a jury trial, the district 
court noted that "[t]he fact finder will therefore be determining 
nothing more than whether defendant's pre-existing defense is or is 
not applicable ... "170 as well as determining the extent of damages. 171 
In short, the court characterized the plaintiffs' claim as "nothing 
more than a breach of contract claim for the recovery of money 
damages." 172 
In holding that a constitutional right to a jury trial existed, the 
court relied on both Granjinanciera and Terry. The court viewed the 
reasoning in Granjinanciera as "directly applicable to the present 
case. "173 The court also noted, based on Terry, that the statutory 
right created by § 502 is essentially a legal claim for a breach of 
contract. 174 The court concluded that based on this recent seventh 
amendment precedent, the plaintiffs in Gangitano could similarly 
have a jury. I7S 
In two recent opinions from the federal distrkt court in Ala-
bama, Rhodes v. Piggly Wiggly Alabama Distributing CO.176 and 
Jordan v. Reliable Life Insurance CO.,177 the district court of Alabama 
denied motions to strike jury trial requests and concluded that 
Granjinanciera was controlling. 
In the earlier Jordan decision, the court presaged in dicta what 
would later be its holding in Rhodes when it observed that "[t]he 
166. See infra notes 183-185 and accompanying text. 
167. 733 F. Supp. 342 (S.D. Fla. 1990). 
168. [d. at 342. 
169. [d. 
170. [d. at 343. 
171. [d. 




175. [d. at 343-44. 
176. 741 F. Supp. 1542 (N.D. Ala. 1990) (mem.). 
177. 716 F. Supp. 582 (N.D. Ala. 1989) (mem.). 
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Supreme Court, as presentiy constituted most definitely believes in 
the Seventh Amendment, a belief this court enthusiastically shares."178 
The court interpreted the recent Supreme Court jurisprudence as 
being written "in terms unmistakably applicable to ERISA cases."179 
In Rhodes, the court went further, holding that, in its view, the 
leading Eleventh Circuit case on ERISA jury trial jurisprudence, 
Chilton v. Savannah Foods and Industries,180 no longer represented 
the law of that circuit in the aftermath of Granfinanciera and Terry. 
The court concluded that a seventh amendment right to a jury trial 
exists in § 502 actions in light of "the Supreme Court's post-Chilton 
decisions bearing on the availability of a jury trial in an action 
invoking a congressional enactment." 181 The court also borrowed an 
earlier observation made by Chief Judge Brieant of the Southern 
District of New York, when it hypothesized that "[p]erhaps because 
the right to a jury trial on claims of legal entitlement is so obvious, 
ERISA makes no express provision for jury trials .... "182 
Finally, in Vicinanzo v. Brunschwig & Fils, Inc.,183 the district 
court thoroughly discussed the seventh amendment right to a jury 
trial in § 502 actions in light of the recent Supreme Court jurispru-
dence. In concluding that plaintiffs had a seventh amendment right 
to a jury, the court characterized the Supreme Court cases as a 
"recognition of the true force of the Seventh Amendment" which 
"suggests doctrinal change affecting a host of federal statutes that 
do not involve the adjudication of 'public rights' by non-Article III 
tribunals. "184 
178. [d. at 585 (citing Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33 (1989». 
179. [d. at 583 n.1. 
180. 814 F.2d 620 (11th Cir. 1987). But see infra, note 186. 
181. 741 F. Supp. at 1543. Although the court never explicitly referred to the Terry 
or Gran/inanciera decisions, the court did cite to a number of previous district 
court decisions which had cited to the Supreme Court cases by name. [d. 
182. [d. at 1544 (citations omitted). The opinion also contains a lengthy, often 
vibrant, discussion of the history of the seventh amendment, and the jury 
practice in pre-1791 England. 
183. 739 F. Supp. 882, 887-90 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). 
184. [d. at 889. As further proof of the scope of these changes, the court referred 
to a gratuitous footnote published in Lytle v. Household Mfg., Inc., 494 U.S. 
545 (1990), decided on the same day as Terry. In Lytle, the Supreme Court 
observed that it had "not ruled on the question whether a plaintiff seeking 
relief under Title VII has a right to a jury trial[.]" [d. at 549 n.1. The 
Vicinanzo court found this footnote to be "astonishing" since Title VII has 
"long been regarded as a non-jury statute." 739 F. Supp at 889. The Southern 
District of New York concluded that "[t]aken together, the Supreme Court's 
recent cases suggest that statutory causes of action giving rise to individual 
claims for money damages are rarely, if ever, beyond the reach of the Seventh 
Amendment." [d. at 890. 
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Of the courts facing the seventh amendment right to a jury trial 
in a § 502 action after Granfinanciera and Terry, only one court -
the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit - has expressly cited 
to Terry and Granfinanciera while still denying the jury right. In 
Blake v. Unionmutual Stock Life Insurance Co., 18S the court denied 
plaintiffs request for a jury trial in a § 502 action to recover a fixed 
sum of money allegedly due under a group insurance plan. It is 
noteworthy, however, that despite citing to both Supreme Court jury 
trial cases, the Blake court never explicitly discusses the effects of 
either Terry or Granfinanciera on the jury trial right. In fact, while 
the court does address those two cases, it does so only in supporting 
a separate proposition; namely, that the change in the standard of 
review caused by Firestone from arbitrary and capricious to de novo 
does not "control the application of the Seventh Amendment" in a 
§ 502 action. 186 Thus, it is not entirely clear whether the Eleventh 
Circuit would read Terry and Granfinanciera to support the seventh 
amendment jury trial right in a § 502 action. 187 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The issue of whether a litigant has a right to a jury trial in a § 
502 action is still open among the federal courts at both the district 
and circuit level. While a majority of courts tend to agree that there 
is no implied statutory authority that preserves the right, a handful 
of courts continue to read the legislative history to imply a right to 
a jury trial. Although the change in the standard of review in 
Firestone has had minimal impact on the § 502 jury trial issue, the 
recent Supreme Court decisions in Granfinanciera and Terry have 
sparked some new debate in federal courts deciding whether the 
seventh amendment preserves a jury trial right in a § 502 action. 
Several district courts have interpreted the Supreme Court's seventh 
amendment jurisprudence to grant a constitutional right to a § 502 
jury trial. 
Given the force of the holdings in Granfinanciera and Terry and 
the present composition of the Court, if the Supreme Court were to 
185. 906 F.2d 1525 (11th Cir. 1990). 
186. [d. at 1526. 
187. Thus, the Northern District of Alabama was in error when it asserted in Rhodes 
v. Piggly Wiggly Ala. Distrib. Co., 741 F. Supp. 1542 (N.D. Ala. 1990), that 
the leading Eleventh Circuit case on the § 502 jury trial issue, Chilton v. 
Savannah Foods & Indus., 814 F.2d 620 (lith Cir. 1987), was no longer good 
law in light of the recent Supreme Court jurisprudence on the seventh amend-
ment issue. Rhodes, 741 F. Supp at 1543. Rhodes was decided just one day 
before Blake. Since the Blake court cited its earlier decision in Chilton with 
approval, see Blake 906 F.2d at 1526, then Chilton is apparently still the law 
of the Eleventh Circuit on the § 502 jury issue. 
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decide· whether a litigant in a § 502 action is entitled to a jury trial, 
it appears quite likely that if the litigant were to seek monetary relief, 
the Court would hold that the seventh amendment preserves the right 
to have a jury hear the case. This conclusion is drawn from several 
observations: (1) the Court's increasing emphasis on the "type of 
relief requested" element of the seventh amendment test, and its 
corresponding waning emphasis on the importance of the historical 
analogy; (2) the Court's treatment of the trust analogy in Terry, in 
·which it held that even though the plaintiff's claim was analogous 
to a suit at trust, which is historically equitable, the Court nevertheless 
found a jury trial right; (3) the Court's decision in Firestone changing 
the standard of review to de novo, thus avoiding any potential 
problem a jury would have in applying the "arbitrary and capricious" 
standard of review; and (4) the Court's decision in Granfinanciera 
granting a jury trial right in an administrative bankruptcy proceeding, 
where jury trials had never been held previously and which are seated 
by non-Article III judges. Taken together, these three Supreme Court 
decisions indicate that the present court is quite willing to utilize the 
seventh amendment to preserve the right to a trial by jury in cases 
where the plaintiff seeks legal relief, regardless of the historical 
practice. 
A civil litigant in federal court seeking an ERISA jury trial 
should argue, based on this recent Supreme Court jurisprudence, that 
the seventh amendment preserves the right to a jury trial. The § 502 
claim should be styled as an action for breach of contract (the 
contract being the benefit's plan that is covered by ERISA), request-
ing monetary relief. Moreover, if the complaint alleges disputes as 
to the interpretation of provisions in the "contract," the litigant will 
be even more likely to have a jury resolve his claims, as long as the 
ERISA plan does not expressly grant the plan administrator the 
discretion to interpret its provisions. 
Michael McCabe, Jr. 
